Janet Evans v. NY & NJ Port Authority by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-21-2011 
Janet Evans v. NY & NJ Port Authority 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Janet Evans v. NY & NJ Port Authority" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 830. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/830 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3829 
_____________ 
 
JANET L. EVANS; ROBERT A. COPLIN;  
ANNETTE BARRY-SMITH; ROCHELLE JOYNER;  
RONALD SMITH; BONNIE L. FORD;  
NEIL SKELTON; JUDITH A. SAMUEL 
 
v. 
 
PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY,  
its employees, agents, and/or servants 
 
Janet L. Evans; Robert A. Coplin, Appellants 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of  New Jersey 
District Court  No. 2-06-cv-03239 
District Judge: The Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 21, 2011) 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Janet Evans and Robert A. Coplin appeal from an order of the United States  
District Court for the District of New Jersey, which granted the motion for 
summary judgment filed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.1
 Evans and Coplin sued their employer, the Port Authority, asserting several 
causes of action alleging that the Port Authority  had discriminated against them on 
the basis of race in failing to promote them.
  For 
the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
2  The Port Authority succeeded in 
moving for the dismissal of several claims.  After the close of discovery, the Port 
Authority filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims of race 
discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Evans, and of racial 
discrimination under § 1983 by Coplin.  The District Court appropriately applied 
the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework.3
                                                 
1   The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the Notice of Appeal specifically states 
that the appeal is from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we decline to 
review any of the earlier rulings in this case.  See Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 
F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (observing that “[i]f an appeal is taken only from a specified 
judgment, the court does not acquire jurisdiction to review other judgments not specified 
or ‘fairly inferred’ by the Notice”).   
  The Court concluded that 
2   Evans and Coplin are two of seven plaintiffs from the District Court proceeding.  The 
other five chose not to participate in this appeal.  Accordingly, we limit our discussion to 
the facts bearing on the contentions of error raised by Evans and Coplin.  
3   See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).  This 
framework, as the District Court properly noted, also applies to claims of racial 
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neither Evans nor Coplin had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination.  
In addition, the Court determined that the Port Authority had proffered legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reasons for its failure to promote Evans and Coplin and that 
neither had shown that these reasons were pretextual.   
 On appeal, Evans and Coplin contend that the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment because it made credibility determinations.  Our 
review of a court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Doe v. C.A.R.S. 
Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008).   
Evans contends that the District Court erred in determining that she failed to 
demonstrate, as part of her prima facie case, that she was qualified for the position 
of Director of Government and Community Affairs.  In her view, the Court erred 
because it made its own judgment as to her qualifications.  The Court explained, 
however, that Evans failed to provide any evidence regarding the experience, 
knowledge, and skills required for the position.  Nothing in our review provides a 
basis for concluding otherwise.  Furthermore, Evans has not directed us to any 
evidence of record that refutes the District Court’s determination.  Because Evans 
failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under either Title VII or 
§ 1983, we conclude that the District Court did not err by granting the Port 
                                                                                                                                                             
discrimination asserted under § 1983.  Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
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Authority’s motion for summary judgment. 
The District Court also determined that Coplin failed to demonstrate the 
prima facie element that he was qualified for the position of Labor Relations 
Specialist.  This was error, as Coplin demonstrated that he was among the eleven 
individuals interviewed for the position.  See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and 
Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (reiterating that a plaintiff meets his 
burden of adducing a prima facie case by showing that he “was sufficiently 
qualified to be among those persons from whom a selection, to some extent 
discretionary, would be made”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).   
The District Court did not err, however, in concluding that Coplin failed to 
show that the Port Authority’s proffered reason for not promoting him was 
pretextual.  The Court noted, and the record confirms, that the Port Authority 
explained that Coplin had not been selected for the position because he had 
received the next-to-lowest rating of the eleven candidates who were interviewed.  
The Port Authority pointed out that it had awarded the position to a Caucasian 
female who had attained the second-highest score during the interview process.  
Coplin does not challenge these facts.  Instead, he asserts that the District Court 
employed the wrong standard.  But as we explained above, supra n. 3, the Court 
applied the proper standard to his § 1983 claim.   
Evans and Coplin also assert that the District Court erred because it failed to 
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apply a mixed motive analysis.  See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 
(2003).  We disagree.  A mixed motive case requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that 
race was a motivating factor.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 
101.  In the absence of a prima facie case of discrimination, or a showing that an 
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment actions were 
either a post-hoc fabrication or a pretext, there is no inference of discrimination.  
See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993).  Without an 
inference that a protected factor played a part in an employer’s action, there is no 
basis for a district court to apply a mixed motive analysis.   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
 
